fix: harden input validation across all RPC endpoints (PENTEST-02)
Manual security audit of 130+ RPC endpoints. Critical fixes: - LND: validate pubkey (66-char hex), Bitcoin addresses, channel points, amount bounds, payment request format, memo length, peer address - Package: validate_app_id on start/stop/restart/bundled-app handlers, validate volume host paths (must be under /var/lib/archipelago/), validate Docker image in bundled-app-start - Container: validate_app_id on all 6 handlers, canonicalize manifest paths - Network: path traversal prevention in connection request deletion - Backup: backup ID validation in delete handler - Webhooks: URL scheme validation, SSRF prevention for private IPs - Security: validate app_id in secret rotation - Interfaces: WiFi password length/null validation, strict IP/gateway/DNS parsing for static ethernet config Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- [x] **PENTEST-01** — Run automated penetration test suite. Execute `scripts/verify-pentest-fixes.sh` and `scripts/test-security.sh`. Add new tests: SQL injection (even though no SQL -- test RPC params), command injection (test all params that touch shell), auth bypass attempts, session fixation, privilege escalation via container escape. **Acceptance**: All pen tests pass.
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- [ ] **PENTEST-02** — Conduct manual security review of all RPC endpoints. Review each of the 80+ RPC endpoints in `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` for: input validation, authorization checks, information disclosure, timing attacks on auth endpoints. Document findings. **Acceptance**: All endpoints reviewed; critical issues fixed.
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- [x] **PENTEST-02** — Conduct manual security review of all RPC endpoints. Review each of the 80+ RPC endpoints in `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` for: input validation, authorization checks, information disclosure, timing attacks on auth endpoints. Document findings. **Acceptance**: All endpoints reviewed; critical issues fixed.
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- [ ] **PENTEST-03** — Harden Podman container isolation. Review all container configurations for: no host network access, no privileged mode, minimal capabilities, seccomp profiles, AppArmor profiles applied. Generate and apply AppArmor profiles for each app. **Acceptance**: All containers run with minimal privileges.
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