feat: E2E encrypted Tor channel messages (ChaCha20-Poly1305)

Messages between federated nodes are now end-to-end encrypted:
- X25519 ECDH key agreement from existing ed25519 node identities
- HKDF-SHA256 key derivation with domain separation
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption per message
- Random 12-byte nonce per message via OsRng (CSPRNG)
- Graceful fallback to plaintext if encryption fails
- Receiver auto-detects encrypted vs plaintext messages

The Tor transport was already encrypted (onion routing), this adds
application-layer E2E encryption so even a compromised receiving
backend can't read messages without the node's private key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dorian
2026-03-20 09:04:43 +00:00
parent f0a403b224
commit 9b6adfc42d
3 changed files with 147 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -295,11 +295,14 @@ impl ApiHandler {
from_pubkey: Option<String>,
message: Option<String>,
signature: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
encrypted: bool,
}
let incoming: Incoming = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or(Incoming {
from_pubkey: None,
message: None,
signature: None,
encrypted: false,
});
if let (Some(from), Some(msg)) = (incoming.from_pubkey.as_ref(), incoming.message.as_ref()) {
// Validate from_pubkey is a valid hex ed25519 pubkey
@@ -322,17 +325,44 @@ impl ApiHandler {
.unwrap());
}
}
} else {
// No signature — accept but mark as unverified
tracing::warn!("Node message from {} has no signature — unverified", &from[..16.min(from.len())]);
}
// Sanitize log output to prevent log injection
// Decrypt if the message is E2E encrypted
let plaintext = if incoming.encrypted {
// Load our identity to derive shared secret
let data_dir = std::path::Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago");
let identity_dir = data_dir.join("identity");
match crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&identity_dir).await {
Ok(node_id) => {
match node_msg::decrypt_from_peer(node_id.signing_key(), from, msg) {
Ok(decrypted) => {
tracing::info!("Decrypted E2E message from {}...", &from[..16.min(from.len())]);
decrypted
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("E2E decryption failed from {}: {}", &from[..16.min(from.len())], e);
return Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body(hyper::Body::from(r#"{"error":"Decryption failed"}"#))
.unwrap());
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Cannot decrypt: identity load failed: {}", e);
msg.clone()
}
}
} else {
msg.clone()
};
let safe_from = sanitize_log_string(from);
let safe_msg = sanitize_log_string(msg);
let safe_msg = sanitize_log_string(&plaintext);
tracing::info!("Received message from {}: {}", safe_from, safe_msg);
// Sanitize stored message content (strip HTML entities)
let clean_from = sanitize_html(from);
let clean_msg = sanitize_html(msg);
let clean_msg = sanitize_html(&plaintext);
node_msg::store_received(&clean_from, &clean_msg).await;
}
Ok(Response::builder()

View File

@@ -89,7 +89,25 @@ impl RpcHandler {
let (data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
let pubkey = data.server_info.pubkey.clone();
node_message::send_to_peer(onion, &pubkey, message).await?;
// Load signing key for E2E encryption
let identity_dir = self.config.data_dir.join("identity");
let node_id = crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&identity_dir).await?;
// Look up recipient's pubkey from federation nodes
let fed_nodes = federation::load_nodes(&self.config.data_dir).await.unwrap_or_default();
let recipient_pubkey = fed_nodes.iter()
.find(|n| n.onion == onion || n.onion == format!("{}.onion", onion)
|| format!("{}.onion", n.onion) == onion)
.map(|n| n.pubkey.clone());
node_message::send_to_peer(
onion,
&pubkey,
message,
Some(node_id.signing_key()),
recipient_pubkey.as_deref(),
).await?;
Ok(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "sent_to": onion }))
}

View File

@@ -135,6 +135,70 @@ fn within_seconds(ts1: &str, ts2: &str, secs: i64) -> bool {
}
}
// ─── E2E Encryption ─────────────────────────────────────────────
use crate::mesh::crypto;
use base64::Engine;
/// Encrypt a message for a recipient using X25519 ECDH + ChaCha20-Poly1305.
/// Returns base64-encoded ciphertext (nonce + encrypted data).
fn encrypt_for_peer(
our_signing_key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
their_pubkey_hex: &str,
plaintext: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let their_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(their_pubkey_hex)
.context("Invalid peer pubkey hex")?
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid peer pubkey length"))?;
let their_x25519 = crypto::ed25519_pubkey_to_x25519(&their_pubkey_bytes)?;
let our_x25519 = crypto::ed25519_secret_to_x25519(our_signing_key);
let shared = crypto::x25519_shared_secret(&our_x25519, &their_x25519);
// HKDF to derive message key (domain separation for Tor messages)
let msg_key_bytes = crypto::hkdf_sha256(
b"archipelago-tor-msg-v1",
&shared,
b"message-encryption",
32,
)?;
let msg_key: [u8; 32] = msg_key_bytes.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("HKDF key length mismatch"))?;
let encrypted = crypto::encrypt(&msg_key, plaintext.as_bytes())?;
Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&encrypted))
}
/// Decrypt a message from a sender using X25519 ECDH + ChaCha20-Poly1305.
pub fn decrypt_from_peer(
our_signing_key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
sender_pubkey_hex: &str,
encrypted_b64: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let sender_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(sender_pubkey_hex)
.context("Invalid sender pubkey hex")?
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid sender pubkey length"))?;
let sender_x25519 = crypto::ed25519_pubkey_to_x25519(&sender_pubkey_bytes)?;
let our_x25519 = crypto::ed25519_secret_to_x25519(our_signing_key);
let shared = crypto::x25519_shared_secret(&our_x25519, &sender_x25519);
let msg_key_bytes = crypto::hkdf_sha256(
b"archipelago-tor-msg-v1",
&shared,
b"message-encryption",
32,
)?;
let msg_key: [u8; 32] = msg_key_bytes.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("HKDF key length mismatch"))?;
let encrypted = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(encrypted_b64).context("Invalid base64 ciphertext")?;
let plaintext_bytes = crypto::decrypt(&msg_key, &encrypted)?;
String::from_utf8(plaintext_bytes).context("Decrypted message is not valid UTF-8")
}
// ─── Tor Messaging ──────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Tor v3 onion hostname is 56 base32 chars (a-z, 2-7). Reject invalid formats.
@@ -153,8 +217,16 @@ fn validate_onion(onion: &str) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Send a message to a peer over Tor.
pub async fn send_to_peer(onion: &str, from_pubkey: &str, message: &str) -> Result<()> {
/// Send an encrypted message to a peer over Tor.
/// The message is encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 using an X25519 shared secret
/// derived from both nodes' ed25519 keys.
pub async fn send_to_peer(
onion: &str,
from_pubkey: &str,
message: &str,
signing_key: Option<&ed25519_dalek::SigningKey>,
recipient_pubkey: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<()> {
validate_onion(onion)?;
let host = if onion.ends_with(".onion") {
@@ -163,10 +235,26 @@ pub async fn send_to_peer(onion: &str, from_pubkey: &str, message: &str) -> Resu
format!("{}.onion", onion)
};
let url = format!("http://{}/archipelago/node-message", host);
// Encrypt message if we have both keys
let (payload_message, encrypted) = match (signing_key, recipient_pubkey) {
(Some(sk), Some(rpk)) => {
match encrypt_for_peer(sk, rpk, message) {
Ok(enc) => (enc, true),
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Encryption failed, sending plaintext: {}", e);
(message.to_string(), false)
}
}
}
_ => (message.to_string(), false),
};
let body = serde_json::json!({
"from_pubkey": from_pubkey,
"message": message,
"message": payload_message,
"timestamp": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
"encrypted": encrypted,
});
let proxy = reqwest::Proxy::all(TOR_SOCKS).context("Invalid Tor proxy")?;